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I. Introduction
THE PAST YEAR saw no cessation in cases reporting on the conflicts
that arise when local land-use regulation is applied to uses claiming
protection under the First Amendment. This report highlights the two
major developments in this area-the courts' treatment of claims
brought under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993' and the
latest decision of the U.S. Supreme Court concerning sign regulation,
City ofLadue v. Gilleo2 -and discusses other cases involving regulation
of religious institutions, adult businesses, and signs.
II. Regulation of Religious Institutions
A. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
In 1993, congressional dissatisfaction with the decision in Employment
Division v. Smith3 decision led to the enactment of the Religious Free-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000b, 2000b-4 (1994).
2. 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994).
3. Traditionally, free exercise challenges to government regulation of religion
did not involve claims that government impermissibly singled-out religious activity
for regulatory treatment, but rather, that an individual or religious institution should
be exempted from an otherwise valid, neutral regulation of general applicability. In
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), however, the Court held that "the
right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with
a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes
(or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).' "Id. at 879 (quot-
ing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
In Smith, the Court divided 5-to-4 in rejecting the Free Exercise claim of two Oregon
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dom Restoration Act,4 which provides that "[g]overnment shall not
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability decision." 5 The statute per-
mits exceptions to this rule only if there is a "compelling governmental
interest" and the burden "is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest." 6 Because the purpose of the
Act was to overturn a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, both courts
7
and scholars s have questioned the Act's constitutionality on separation
of powers grounds, a question that will, no doubt, ultimately be resolved
by the Court. In the meantime, the protection of the Act is being claimed
in an increasing number of land-use cases with mixed results.
In Western Presbyterian Church v. District of Columbia,9 the church
sought to enjoin the enforcement of a zoning ordinance that would have
required it, after moving to a new location, to obtain a variance to
continue operating its food-for-the-homeless program. In granting the
injunction, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held
that the variance requirement constituted a substantial burden on the free
exercise of religion and thus invoked the Act in granting the requested
injunction. But in Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City of Daytona
Beach, ° a Florida federal district court not only rejected a similar
claim-that the Act barred the application of locational restrictions to
a homeless shelter and food bank proposed to be housed in a church-
state employees who had been denied unemployment benefits after they were fired as
drug and alcohol counselors because the state viewed their religiously motivated peyote
smoking as work-related misconduct. Three years after Smith, however, in Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993), the Court
unanimously agreed on the general principle that laws which are nonneutral, because
their object is to infringe upon or restrict practices based on their religious motivation,
may only be upheld if justified by a compelling governmental interest and the law is
narrowly tailored to advance that interest. Hialeah thus sent a strong signal to the
lower courts that the Smith decision should not be read to permit the targeting of
religious practices under the guise of a purportedly general and religiously neutral
ordinance.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000b-2000b-4.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000b-l(a).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000b-l(b).
7. Compare Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex. 1995)
(holding Act unconstitutional on grounds Congress did not act pursuant to an enumer-
ated power), with Belgrad v. Hawaii, No. 93-00961 HG, 1995 WL 170221 (D. Haw.
1995) (holding Act constitutional pursuant to Congress' enforcement power under §
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
8. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting
the Fox into the Henhouse Under Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
16 CARDOZO L. REV. 357 (1994); Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act: Pushing the Limits of Legislative Power, 73 TEX. L. REV. 247 (1994).
9. 849 F. Supp. 77 (D.D.C. 1994).
10. No. 94-0575, 1995 WL 289632 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
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but went on to find that "the City's interest in regulating homeless
shelters and food banks is a compelling interest and that [the zoning]
code furthers that interest in the least restrictive means,"" thus uphold-
ing the city under the First Amendment analysis that predated Smith. 2
In other cases decided under the Act, courts have: denied a claim
that the Act bars the application of parking requirements to religious
institutions;' 3 held that the Act does not apply to uses that constitute
a nuisance, in this instance a massive display of Christmas lights that
created traffic jams and other problems in a residential neighbor-
hood; 14 and denied a preliminary injunction to plaintiffs claiming that
the Act bars the need for a special permit for a Wiccan Church in a
residential district. 15
B. Zoning Cases Involving Religious Institutions
Although state courts have traditionally applied substantive due process
analysis in cases dealing with zoning control over religious institu-
tions, 16 in the past decade there has been a movement in some state
courts toward applying an analysis based on the First Amendment.
Recent cases that illustrate this trend include: Grace Community
Church v. Town of Bethel, 17 Macedonian Orthodox Church v. Planning
Board of the Township of Randolph, 18 and Kali Bari Temple v. Board
of Adjustment. 19
C. Historic Preservation of Religious Institutions
The courts are split regarding constitutional challenges to the applica-
tion of historic preservation ordinances to religious institutions. In Soci-
11. Id. at *6.
12. See also First Assembly of God Inc. v. Collier County, 20 F.3d 419 (11th
Cir. 1994), opinion modified on denial of reh 'g, 27 F.3d 526 (1 1th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 730 (1995). Here, the Eleventh Circuit, without reference to the
Act, ruled that various zoning laws did not violate the First Amendment. Subsequently,
the Eleventh Circuit modified its opinion, stating that "the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act of 1993 may apply to this case. However, since it was not raised by either
party, we decline to discuss it." First Assembly, 27 F.3d at 526.
13. Germantown Seventh Day Adventist Church v. Philadelphia, No. 94-1633,
1994 WL 470191 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
14. Osborne v. Power, 890 S.W.2d 570 (Ark. 1994) (citing dictum in Western
Presbyterian).
15. Church of Iron Oak v. Palm Bay, 868 F. Supp. 1361 (M.D. Fla. 1994). The
court also declined to enter an injunction due to the doctrine of abstention.
16. See, e.g., BRIAN W. BLAESSER & ALAN C. WEINSTEIN, LAND USE AND THE
CONSTITUTION 131-32 (1989).
17. 622 A.2d 591 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993).
18. 636 A.2d 96 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (finding no First Amendment
violation).
19. 638 A.2d 839 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (ruling that denial of variance
to permit occasional religious worship of small numbers of persons in private home
was unjustified).
FALL 1995
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ety of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Commission2 ° and First Covenant
Church v. City of Seattle,2" the Massachusetts and Washington supreme
courts, respectively, found that the designation of a church as a land-
mark violated the applicable state and/or federal constitution, while in
St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York,22 the Second Circuit
held that the Free Exercise Clause did not require the New York City
Landmarks Commission to permit a church to demolish a landmarked
auxiliary building in order to erect an office tower in its place. Most
recently, in First United Methodist Church v. Seattle Landmarks Preser-
vation Board,23 the Washington Court of Appeals held that the Free
Exercise Clause did not prohibit the city from designating a church
building as a landmark, but would prohibit the Landmarks Preservation
Board from restricting any modifications to the building unless and
until it was no longer used primarily .for religious purposes. This is,
of course, a distinction without a difference, since landmark designation
of this sort is no more than honorific and provides no protection against
actions that would alter or destroy the landmark.
III. Adult Business Regulations24
A. Zoning Restrictions on Location
In a series of cases decided between 1976 and 1986, the U.S. Supreme
Court established that municipalities could single out adult businesses
for special regulatory treatment in the form of locational restrictions
if the municipality could show a substantial public interest in regulating
such businesses unrelated to the suppression of speech and if the regula-
tions allow for a reasonable number of alternative locations. However,
an ordinance will be struck down when cities attempt to regulate on
the basis that they object to the sexually explicit messages conveyed by
adult businesses or seek to exclude, or severely restrict, adult businesses
25using an outright ban or excessive locational requirements.
20. 564 N.W.2d 571 (Mass. 1990).
21. 787 P.2d 1352 (Wash. 1990) (en banc), vacated and remanded, II1 S. Ct.
1097 (1991), holding reinstated, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992).
22. 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991).
23. 887 P.2d 473 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
24. The terms "adult business" or "adult entertainment business" typically refer
to bookstores, theaters, mini-theaters, video rental stores, bars, and cabarets that purvey
"adult entertainment" consisting of performances or merchandise characterized by
an emphasis on nudity and sexual acts. See generally J. GERARD, LOCAL REGULATION
OF ADULT BUSINESS (1992); F. STROM, ZONING CONTROL OF SEX BUSINESS (1977).
25. Young v. American Mini-Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding constitu-
tionality of amendments to Detroit's "Anti-Skid Row" ordinance that singled-out adult
bookstores for special zoning treatment in the form of a "dispersion" requirement
that prohibited such businesses from locating within 1,000 feet of any two other similarly
regulated uses and also prohibited adult bookstores and theaters from locating within
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Locational restrictions can easily be manipulated to severely restrict
the number of permissible sites available for adult businesses and/or
to require them to operate in undesirable locations. In particular, when
combined with amortization provisions that force many, if not all,
existing businesses to relocate within a relatively short period, severe
locational restrictions can effectively terminate the operation of adult
businesses in a community.26 In City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters,
Inc., the Supreme Court stated that while government may not "effec-
tively deny" adult businesses "a reasonable opportunity to open and
operate," adult businesses "must fend for themselves in the real estate
market on an equal footing with other prospective purchasers and les-
sees. ,,27 Since the Renton decision, courts have struggled to de-
velop a standard for judging the reasonableness of locational restric-
tions. The standard emerging from recent cases focuses on whether
there are an adequate number of potential sites for adult businesses
within the relevant local real estate market.
The "real estate market" standard initially appeared in the Fifth
Circuit's 1992 decision in Woodall v. City of El Paso,2 s where, after
recognizing that Renton "contemplated that there was a 'market' in
which [adult] businesses could purchase or lease real property on which
business could be conducted," the court ruled that "land with physical
characteristics that render it unavailable for any kind of development,
or legal characteristics that exclude adult businesses, may not be consid-
ered 'available' for constitutional purposes under Renton." However,
the court declined to address "the relationship between the economics
of site location and the constitutionality of an adult business zoning
ordinance."- 29 In a later ruling in this same case,3 ° the Fifth Circuit
applied this standard to reverse and remand a district court decision
on the ground that the jury had improperly taken commercial reason-
ableness into account when it determined that the adult business provi-
500 feet of a residential dwelling); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S.
61 (1981) (holding that ordinance banning all live entertainment was invalid because
it intruded too far on rights protected by the First Amendment); City of Renton v.
Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding a Seattle suburb's ordinance
that concentrated adult businesses in an area comprising only 5% of the city).
26. See, e.g., Woodall v. City of El Paso, 959 F.2d 1305, modifying 950 F.2d
255 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 304 (1992) (requiring all 39 adult businesses
in city to relocate). See also Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 928 F.2d 278 (8th
Cir. 1991) (requiring at least 30 of 36 adult businesses to relocate to 0.54 percent of
the total land area of the city.).
27. Renton, 475 U.S. at 42.
28. 959 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1992).
29. Id. at 1306.
30. Woodall, 49 F.3d at 1120.
FALL 1995
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sions of the zoning ordinance left insufficient locations for adult busi-
nesses.31
In Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,32 the Ninth Circuit
squarely faced the economics question which Woodall had avoided.
Recognizing that the distinction between economic and other factors
is difficult to maintain because physical and legal unavailability can
be presented as economic unavailability-e.g., a site located five miles
from the nearest public road could be seen either as physically unavail-
able or, given the cost of constructing an access route, as economically
unavailable-the Ninth Circuit concluded that the economics of site
location is a valid inquiry, so long as the economic analysis focuses
on whether a site is part of the relevant real estate market.33
After reviewing several decisions involving locational restrictions,
the Ninth Circuit noted the conditions that need to apply for a particular
site to be considered part of the relevant real estate market. First,
although Renton stressed that properties only had to be "potentially"
available, the court argued that "a property is not 'potentially' available
when it is unreasonable to believe that it would ever become available
to any commercial enterprise." Second, sites in manufacturing or in-
dustrial zones are part of the market if they are: reasonably accessible
to the general public; have a proper infrastructure of sidewalks, roads,
and lighting; and generally suitable for some form of commercial enter-
prise. Third, and most obviously, commercially zoned locations are
part of the real estate market. Once a site qualifies as part of the real
estate market under these criteria, however, its "commercial viability"
as an adult business location is irrelevant. Applying these criteria to
the relocation sites offered under the challenged Los Angeles ordinance,
the court concluded that much of the land "potentially available" for
the relocation of adult businesses was not part of the real estate market
and struck down the ordinance because it did not provide a sufficient
number of "reasonably available" sites for the relocation of adult busi-
nesses.
31. Id. at 1120.
32. 989 F.2d 1524 (9th Cir. 1993).
33. Id. at 1530. The court stated:
Accordingly, we do not think that Renton forbids a court to consider economics
when evaluating whether a particular site is in fact part of the real estate market.
For purposes of Renton, the distinction is between consideration of economic impact
within an actual business real estate market and consideration of cost to determine
whether a specific relocation site is part of the relevant market. A court may not
consider the former, but it may consider the latter when determining whether a
specific site is reasonably suitable for the operation of a business.
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The Topanga approach, which allows consideration of economic
factors to define the relevant real estate market but bars consideration
of "commercial viability" for particular sites that are found to be within
the relevant market, presents a workable standard for judging whether
sites for adult businesses are "reasonably available." This approach
allows local government to impose significant locational restrictions
on adult businesses to avoid undesirable secondary effects, but prevents
local government from effectively banning such businesses by limiting
them to locations that present insuperable physical, legal, or economic
barriers to development or operation.
The starting point for drafting locational restrictions to meet the
Topanga test is to meet the three factors noted above. In addition,
planners and elected officials need to be cautious about "distancing"
requirements-i.e., no adult use may locate within 1,000 feet of another
adult use or within 1,000 feet of a church, school, playground, etc.-
since these dramatically reduce the land available for sites in any given
area. To better understand the effect of a 1,000 foot distancing require-
ment, consider that the requirement erects an imaginary circular fence
enclosing seventy-two acres34 that are barred to adult uses. The more
uses to which the requirement applies, of course, the more seventy-two
acre circles that are barred to adult businesses.
B. Licensing Ordinances
In FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,35 the Court ruled for the first time
on whether the licensing provisions of a comprehensive adult business
ordinance constitute a prior restraint on freedom of expression. Six
Justices agreed that the licensing provisions were an unconstitutional
prior restraint because, rather than penalizing expression after the fact,
they prevented the expression from occurring in the first place. While
such prior restraints are not unconstitutional per se, there is a strong
presumption that they are not constitutionally valid. However, the six
Justices split evenly on exactly what procedural safeguards were re-
quired to validate an adult business licensing ordinance. All six agreed
that such ordinances must not "place unbridled discretion in the hands
of a government official or agency, ' 36 must require a definite time
limit within which the decision maker must issue or deny the license,
during which time the status quo must be maintained, and must allow for
34. The 1,000 foot requirement creates a circle with a radius of 1,000 feet and
thus an area of 3,141,600 square feet, which equals 72 acres.
35. 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
36. Id.
FALL 1995
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prompt judicial review if the license is erroneously denied. However,
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, argued
that a licensing ordinance must require that the government bear both
the burden of going to court to enforce the denial of a license application
and the burden of proof in court.37
Recent decisions applying the FW/PBS ruling have struck down li-
censing ordinances that lacked effective time limitations,38 failed to
limit the discretion of city officials to grant or deny a license, 39 required
adult businesses operating at the time a licensing ordinance was enacted
to cease operations until they obtained a license,' or charged higher
fees for adult businesses, because this regulated on the basis of the
content of expression.4 Likewise, in JJR, Inc. v. City of Seattle,42
the Washington Supreme Court, without citing FW/PBS, held that a
licensing scheme that allowed the city to revoke or suspend a license
to operate an adult business without a mandatory stay of revocation
or suspension pending judicial review was an invalid prior restraint
under the state constitution. Conversely, where a licensing scheme
provides adequate procedural safeguards, it will be upheld. 3
C. Regulating Nude Dancing Through Public
Indecency Laws
In Barnes v. Glen Theatres, Inc.,"4 a divided Supreme Court upheld
the application of Indiana's public indecency statute to prohibit totally
nude dancing in bars and cabarets. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, delivered the opinion of the Court
upholding the statute,45 with Justices Scalia and Souter writing separate
37. Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion arguing for the lesser standard, which wasjoined by Justices Kennedy and Stevens. The procedural safeguards about which the
Justices disagreed were first stated in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
38. See, e.g., 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 32
F.3d 109 (4th Cir. 1994); Redner v. Dean, 29 F.3d 1495 (11th Cir. 1994); MGA
SUSU, Inc. v. County of Benton, 853 F. Supp. 1147 (D. Minn. 1994).
39. See, e.g., East Brooks Books, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 48 F.3d 220 (6th
Cir. 1995), reh "g denied; MGA SUSU, Inc. v. County of Benton, 853 F. Supp. 1147
(D. Minn. 1994).
40. See TK's Video, Inc. v. Denton County, 24 F.3d 705 (5th Cir. 1994); Grand
Brittain, Inc. v. City of Amarillo, 27 F.3d 1068 (5th Cir. 1994).
41. See AAK, Inc. v. City of Woonsocket, 830 F. Supp. 99 (D. R.I. 1993).
42. 891 P.2d 720 (1995).
43. See, e.g., City of Colorado Springs v. 2354, Inc., 896 P.2d 272 (Colo. 1995),
reh 'g denied June 1995.
44. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
45. Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion acknowledged that nude dancing
is expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment, but found that it was only
"marginally" within the Amendment's "outer perimeters."
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concurring opinions.46 Justice White, joined by Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens, dissented.47 Although the Rehnquist and Scalia
opinions gave a green light to state and local governments to bar nude
dancing on public morality grounds, the fact that Justice Souter, who
provided the crucial fifth vote to uphold the statute, based his concurring
opinion on a secondary effects justification for the statute has strongly
influenced subsequent court decisions.
Courts have routinely upheld ordinances prohibiting nude dancing
in adult entertainment establishments based on a showing that the ordi-
nance was aimed at avoiding undesirable secondary effects.4a Courts
will also invoke the Twenty-First Amendment to uphold local ordi-
nances that prohibit nude dancing in bars, deny a liquor license to
any establishment that features totally nude dancing , or require more
clothing to be worn by erotic dancers in an establishment serving alcohol
than by citizens on the streets or beaches .
By contrast, courts have struck down ordinances that extended the
nude dancing ban to "mainstream" establishments, 5 or, conversely,
46. Justices Scalia and Souter concurred in the judgment of the Court upholding
the Indiana statute, but each wrote separately to state his differing views on the reasons
why it should be upheld. Justice Scalia, who viewed the public indecency law as a
general law regulating conduct and not specifically directed at expression, argued that
the statute should not be subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all. By contrast, Justice
Souter provided a far more cautious fifth vote to uphold the statute. While he agreed
with both the plurality and dissent that the nude dancing at issue in this case is subject
to a degree of First Amendment protection, and agreed with the plurality's use of the
O'Brien test, he wrote separately because he viewed the justification for the statute
to be not public morality, the position taken by both the plurality and Justice Scalia,
but the substantial governmental interest in establishments that offer nude dancing.
Justice Souter's analysis under the O'Brien test thus finds support in both the Young
and Renton decisions. 111 S. Ct. at 2469-2470.
47. The four dissenters, in an opinion authored by Justice White, argued that the
statute directly regulates expressive activity and so may only be justified by a compelling
state interest that is narrowly drawn. But rather than narrowly tailoring a statute to
adres prostitution and associated evils, or using its authoity under the Twenty-First
Amendment to regulate nude dancing in bars. See Newport v. Iacobucci, 479 U.S.
92 (1986) (per curiam), reh 'g denied, 479 U.S. 1047 (1987); New York State Liquor
Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714 (1981) (per curiam); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S.
109 (1972), reh 'g denied, 410 U.S. 948 (1973). Indiana impermissibly chose to ban
an entire category of expressive activity.
48. See, e.g., Cafe 270, Inc. v. St. Johns County, 856 F. Supp. 641 (M.D. Fla.
1994); Bright Lights, Inc. v. City of Newport, 830 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. Ky. 1993);
Dodger's Bar & Grill v. Johnson County Bd. of Comm'rs, 815 F. Supp. 399 (D. Kan.
1993), remanded on other grounds, 32 F.3d 1436 (10th Cir. 1994); O'Malley v. City
of Syracuse, 813 F. Supp. 133 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); Gravely v. Bacon, 429 S.E.2d 663
(Ga. 1993); S.J.T., Inc. v. Richmond County, 430 S.E.2d 726 (Ga. 1993).
49. See Proctor v. County of Penobscot, 651 A.2d 355 (Me. 1994); Knudtson v.
City of Coates, 519 N.W.2d 166 (Minn. 1994).
50. See Dodger's Bar & Grill, 815 F. Supp. at 399.
51. See, e.g., Pel Asso, Inc. v. Joseph, 427 S.E.2d 264 (Ga. 1993).
FALL 1995
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upheld exceptions to the ban that are limited to "mainstream" establish-
ments ,52 because there is no evidence that nude dancing in such estab-
lishments produces undesirable secondary effects. Courts have also not
hesitated to strike down ordinances targeting nude dancing when an
intent to suppress protected expression, rather than the stated concerns
about secondary effects, was the motivation for the ordinance, 3 or the
ordinance was unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. 54
IV. Regulation of Signs and lillboards
A. City of Ladue v. Gilleo55
In Ladue, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled that an ordinance banning
all residential signs, except for those categories of signs falling within
ten exemptions,56 violated the First Amendment rights of homeowners
because it totally foreclosed their opportunity to display political, reli-
gious, or personal messages on their own property. Despite the numer-
ous exceptions in the ordinance, the Court, for the sake of argument,
accepted the city's contention that the ordinance was a content-neutral
"time, place, and manner" regulation, but still struck down the ordi-
nance because the city had foreclosed an important and distinct medium
of expression-lawn signs-to political, personal, or religious mes-
sages,5" and had failed to provide adequate substitutes for such an im-
52. See, e.g., Top Shelf, Inc. v. Mayor of Savannah, 840 F. Supp. 903 (S.D.
Ga. 1993); S.J.T., 430 S.E.2d 726 (1993).
53. See Connor v. Town of Hilton Head Island, 442 S.E.2d 608 (S.C. 1994).
54. Id. See also Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron, 40 F.3d 129 (6th Cir.
1994); Pel Asso, 427 S.E.2d at 264.
55. 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994).
56. The 10 exempted types of signs were: "municipal signs"; "subdivision and
residence identification signs"; "[r]oad signs and driveway signs for danger, direction,
or identification"; "health inspection signs"; "[s]igns for churches, religious institu-
tions, and schools"; "identification signs" for other not-for-profit organizations; signs
"identifying the location of public transportation stops"; "[g]round signs advertising
the sale or rental of real property"; "[c]ommerical signs in commercially zoned or
industrial zoned districts"; and signs that "identifly] safety hazards." Each of these
exempted categories was subject to special size limitations and some were also subject
to additional conditions set out elsewhere in the ordinance. Id. at 2040 n.6.
57. Id. In this case, Margaret Gilleo, a local resident had challenged the ordinance
because it prohibited her from displaying a small sign in the window of her home that
read "For Peace in the Gulf."
58. Id. at 2044-45. The Court described the importance of residential signs:
Signs that react to a local happening or express a view on a controversial issue both
reflect and animate change in the life of a community. Often placed on lawns or
in windows, residential signs play an important part in political campaigns, during
which they are displayed to signal the resident's support for particular candidates,
parties or causes. They may not afford the same opportunities for conveying complex
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portant medium.59 Unfortunately, the Court then declined to provide
any further guidance as to how government can draft residential, as
well as other, sign regulations that will withstand legal challenges,
60
leaving government and the lower courts to "fill in the details" as can
be seen from the cases discussed below.
B. Political Signs
While Ladue ruled that government could not prohibit the display of
political lawn signs at one's residence, other courts have struck down
prohibitions on political signs that applied in both residential and other
ideas as do other media, but residential signs have long been an important and distinct
medium of expression.
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2045 (1994) (footnote omitted).
59. Id. at 2046-47. The Court stated:
Displaying a sign from one's own residence often carries a message quite distinct
from placing the same sign someplace else, or conveying the same text or picture
by other means. Precisely because of their location, such signs provide information
about the identity of the "speaker." As an early and eminent student of rhetoric
observed, the identity of the speaker is an important component of many attempts
to persuade. A sign advocating "Peace in the Gulf' in the front lawn of a retired
general or decorated war veteran may provoke a different reaction than the same
sign in a 10-year-old child's bedroom window or the same message on a bumper
sticker of a passing automobile. An espousal of socialism may carry different implica-
tions when displayed on the grounds of a stately mansion than when pasted on a
factory wall or an ambulatory sandwich board.
Residential signs are an unusually cheap and convenient form of communication.
Especially for persons of modest means or limited mobility, a yard or window sign
may have no practical substitute. . . . Even for the affluent, the added costs in
money or time of taking out a newspaper advertisement, handing out leaflets on the
street, or standing in front of one's house with a handheld sign may make the
difference between participating and not participating in some public debate. Further-
more, a person who puts up a sign at her residence often intends to reach neighbors,
an audience that could not be reached nearly as well by other means.
A special respect for individual liberty in the home has long been part of our
culture and law, . . .that principle has special resonance when the government
seeks to constrain a person's ability to speak there.... Most Americans would be
understandably dismayed, given that tradition, to learn that it was illegal to display
from their window an 8- by 11 -inch sign expressing their political views. Whereas
the government's need to mediate among various competing uses, including expres-
sive ones, for public streets and facilities is constant and unaviodable, . . . its need
to regulate temperate speech from the home is surely much less pressing.
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
60. Id. at 2047. The Court stated that its decision "by no means leaves the City
powerless to address the ills that may be associated with residential signs," but then
could offer no more guidance than to opine that: (1) "individual residents themselves
have strong incentives to keep their own property values up and to prevent 'visual
clutter' in their own yards and neighborhoods;" (2) signs displayed by residents for
a fee or off-site commerical signs or residential property do not raise the same considera-
tions as "political, religious and personal" expression; and (3) "more temperate
measures could in large part satisfy Laude's stated regulatory needs without harm to
First Amendment rights of its citizens." Id.
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districts .61 Courts have also struck down ordinances that place unreason-
able limits on the number of political signs that may be displayed 62 or
that impose time limits only on political signs,63 but have upheld an
ordinance that allowed one noncommercial sign to be displayed all year
long and additional political signs-up to one sign per ballot issue and
one sign per ballot candidate-during the political campaign season.
64
C. Locational Restrictions
As Ladue indicates, courts are increasingly sensitive to the location of
signs as a primary justification for their differing regulatory treatment
of signs.65 For example, the Eleventh Circuit found that a municipal
sign ordinance, barring off-premises billboards in historic districts, was
viewpoint neutral and did not prefer commercial over noncommercial
speech. The court recognized that the ordinance regulated off-premise
signs solely because of their location in the historic district, and found
there was no basis for the claim put forth by those challenging the
ordinance that on-premises signs should be equated with commercial
61. See, e.g., Runyon v. Fasi, 762 F. Supp. 280 (D. Haw. 1991); Fisher v. City
of Charleston, 425 S.E.2d 194 (W. Va. 1992).
62. See, e.g., Arlington County Republican Comm. v. Arlington County, 983
F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1993) (striking down ordinance imposing two-sign limit).
63. See, e.g., Whitton v. City of Gladstone, 54 F.3d 1400 (8th Cir. 199), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 832 F. Supp. 1329 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (invalidating ordinance
limiting the display of political signs to 30 days before and seven days after an election);
McCormack v. Township of Clinton, 872 F. Supp. 1320 (D. N.J. 1994) (granting
preliminary injunction against enforcement of sign ordinance that limited display of
political signs to 10 days prior to and three days after the election); Collier v. City
of Tacoma, 854 P.2d 1046 (D. Wash. 1993) (invalidating ordinance that only permitted
the display of political signs in residential areas for 60 days before and seven days
after an election, but imposed no time restrictions on other temporary signs, on the
grounds that the city could not impose time restrictions on political speech to advance
aesthetic interests until it could show that it was seriously and comprehensively ad-
dressing aesthetic concerns).
64. Brayton v. City of New Brighton, 519 NW.2d 243 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
65. 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994). Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court in
striking down Ladue's ban on residential signs that carry personal, political, or religious
messages, acknowledged that the location of a sign may play a critical role in analyzing
the validity of its regulatory treatment.
Displaying a sign from one's own residence often carries a message quite distinct
from placing the same sign someplace else, or conveying the same text or picture
by other means. Precisely because of their location, such signs provide information
about the identity of the "speaker." As an early and eminent student of rhetoric
observed, the identity of the speaker is an important component of many attempts
to persuade. A sign advocating "Peace in the Gulf' in the front lawn of a retired
general or decorated war veteran may provoke a different reaction than the same
sign in a 10-year-old child's bedroom window or the same message on a bumper
sticker of a passing automobile. An espousal of socialism may carry different implica-
tions when displayed on the grounds of a stately mansion than when pasted on a
factory wall or an ambulatory sandwich board.
Id. at 2046.
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speech and off-premises signs with noncommercial speech. 6 By con-
trast, the Third Circuit struck down a Delaware statute and county
ordinance, which banned all signs in, and within twenty-five feet of
a right-of-way, with certain exceptions, because the exceptions were
not significantly related to the location of the signs and thus violated
content-neutrality. 67
66. Messer v. City of Douglasville, Ga., 975 F.2d 1505 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
67. Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043 (3d Cir. 1994). The court offered
the following explanation for the relationship between the location of a sign and its
regulatory treatment:
A sign that says "Speed Limit 55" or "Rest Stop" is more important on a highway
than is a sign that says "Rappa for Congress." A sign identifying a commerical
establishment is more important on its premises than is a sign advertising an unrelated
product. If the former signs are banned from the highway or the place of business,
there is no other means of communication that can provide equivalent information.
In contrast, placing a sign that says "Rappa for Congress" or "Drink Pepsi" on
a highway, while it may be an important means of communication because of the
number of travelers [sic] on the highway, has no relationship to the property on
which it is placed or to the fact that it is next to a highway. Banning these signs
potentially leaves many alternative means of communicating the same information.
Thus, we conclude that when there is a significant relationship between the content
of particular speech and a specific location or its use, the state can exempt from a
general ban [on] speech having that content so long as the state did not make the
distinction in an attempt to censor certain viewpoints or to control what issues are
appropriate for public debate and so long as the exception also survives the test
proposed by the Metromedia concurrence; i.e., the state must show that the exception
is substantially related to advancing an important state interest that is at least as
important as the interest advanced by the underlying regulation, that the exception
is no broader than necessary to advance the special goal, and that the exception is
narrowly drawn so as to impinge as little as possible on the overall goal.
The requirement that a sign be significantly related to the property can be met
in either of two ways. First, the state can show that a sign is particularly important
to travelers [sic] on the nearby road-for example, a directional sign, or a sign
conveying the nearest location of food. Second, the state can show that a sign better
conveys its information in its particular location than it could anywhere else-for
example, an address sign performs its function better when it is actually on the
property with that address than if it is anywhere else.
By requiring exceptions to be significantly related to a particular locality, we
provide a concrete criterion by which legislatures and courts can evaluate particular
exceptions. Courts will not be making an abstract assessment of the relative worth
of various types of speech. Yet the test we have adopted still allows government
some flexibility to limit speech when it has a significant interest in doing so without
eliminating all speech.
Such flexibility does come at a price-because government is no longer faced
with a choice between banning all speech or none, it is more likely to opt to restrict
speech. But we do not think that government should be forced to refrain from
restricting speech in a place whenever it thinks that particular speech is so important
a component of the place that it will be unwilling to restrict any speech if it has to
restrict that speech. Thus, restating the major components of the test we have adopted,
we hold that when there is a significant relationship between the content of particular
speech and a specific location, the state can exempt speech having that content from
a general ban so long as the exemption is substantially related to serving an interest
that is at least as important as that served by the ban.
Id. at 1064-66 (footnotes omitted).
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D. Regulation of Real Estate Signs
In Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro 68 the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that a local government may not prohibit the use of
temporary real estate signs in residential areas because such a prohibi-
tion unduly restricts the flow of information. In recent cases involving
the regulation of real estate signs, courts have upheld the imposition
of reasonable restrictions on the size, number, and location of real
estate signs in furtherance of legitimate interests such as aesthetics.69
Such restrictions are suspect, however, because they are content-based,
and courts have also recently invalidated restrictions on real estate
signs where the government has failed to convince the court that its
regulations were necessary to achieve a legitimate governmental inter-
est 70 or were not aimed at curtailing information. 7' However, ordinances
that allow temporary real estate signs in residential areas, while prohib-
iting political and other noncommercial temporary signs, are invalid,
both because they restrict the free speech rights of property owners
without providing an alternative channel of communication 72 and grant
more favorable treatment to commercial than to noncommercial mes-
sages.
E. Amortization of Nonconforming Signs
In Naegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Durham,74 the Fourth
Circuit upheld the City of Durham, North Carolina's virtually complete
ban on billboards with commercial messages on them, affirming the
68. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
69. See, e.g., South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors,
935 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom., Greater S. Suburban Bd. of
Realtors v. Blue Island, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992) (upholding restrictions on the size,
placement, and number of realty signs to protect the aesthetic interests of a wooded
semi-rural village).
70. See, e.g., Citizens United for Free Speech v. Long Beach Township Bd. of
Comm'rs, 802 F. Supp. 1223 (D. N.J. 1992) (invalidating ordinance in resort commu-
nity that permitted "for sale" signs and barred "for rent" signs during certain periods
on the ground that community presented no evidence to justify that the ordinance would
achieve its claimed interest in aesthetics). See also City of Dellwood v. Lattimore,
857 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (city failed to show that $50 fee charged for
display of realty signs was reasonably related to the cost of enforcement).
71. See, e.g., Cleveland Area Bd. of Realtors v. City of Euclid, 833 F. Supp.
1253 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (invalidating ordinance restricting realty and other lawn signs,
which, although ostensibly content-neutral, was found to be aimed at the message of
"white flight" conveyed by realty signs, and the window signs that were permitted
did not provide an adequate alternative channel of communication).
72. City ofLadue, 114 S. Ct. at 2038.
73. See, e.g., National Advertising Co. v. Town of Babylon, 703 F. Supp. 228
(E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 900 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1990).
74. 19 F.3d 11 (4th Cir. 1994); 803 F. Supp. 1068 (M.D.N.C. 1992).
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reasoning of the district court which found, after making a detailed
factual inquiry, that the city's five and one-half year amortization period
did not deny Naegele the economically viable use of its property. The
most significant aspect of this case was the district court's determination
that individual billboards are not the appropriate unit of property for
the takings analysis. Rather, because Naegele's advertising sales are
a combination of signs in the Durham metro area, and not sales of
individual signs, the appropriate unit of property for purposes of the
takings analysis had to be based on this marketing factor. Thus, the
court found that the appropriate measuring unit for the takings analysis
was the company's combined group of Durham metropolitan area
signs.75 Having determined the appropriate unit of property, the district
court then undertook an extensive analysis of the factors which were
determinative of whether the ordinance's interference with Naegele's
property constituted a taking .76 The court concluded that while Naegele
had, without question, suffered a significant loss in the value of its
property as a result of the ordinance, the nature and degree of that loss
did not constitute a taking.77
F. Unique Types of Sign Regulation
1. BALTIMORE'S PROHIBITION OF ALCOHOL
AND CIGARETTE ADVERTISING ON
BILLBOARDS
In 1994, federal district courts upheld each of the Baltimore ordinances
enacted to restrict outdoor advertising of cigarettes and alcoholic bever-
ages. In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Balti-
more,78 a brewer and an outdoor advertising company challenged the
ordinance banning billboard advertising of alcoholic beverages, 79 while
Penn Advertising v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, involved an
advertising company's challenge to the ordinance prohibiting cigarette
advertising on billboards located in certain designated zones. In both
75. Naegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 803 F. Supp. at 1073.
76. Id. at 1074-79.
77. Id. at 1080. The court noted, however, that in light of the U.S. Supreme
Court's ruling in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992),
its determination that each individual sign does not constitute a separate unit of property
was significant, because, had there been a finding that each sign did constitute a
separate unit of property, "the Lucas inquiry into the nature of Naegele's title could
be determinative." Id n.7.
78. 855 F. Supp. 811 (D. Md. 1994).
79. In 1993, the Maryland legislature had enacted a statute that delegated authority
to the City of Baltimore to adopt an ordinance restricting outdoor advertising of alcoholic
beverages if the city determined the ordinance is "necessary for the promotion of the
welfare and temperance of minors." Id.
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cases, the courts analyzed the restrictions under the Central Hudson
test for commercial speech,80 and upheld the ordinances.
2. ATLANTA'S OLYMPIC SIGN ORDINANCE
In Outdoor Systems, Inc. v. City of Atlanta,8 a federal district court
invalidated Atlanta's 1994 "Olympic Sign Ordinance," which created
a five member committee to recommend "Concentrated Sign Districts"
within the city where only those signs which promote an Olympic or
Olympic-related event of some kind will be permitted. Applying the
Central Hudson test, the court found that while the ordinance directly
served a substantial governmental interest in promoting Atlanta's host-
ing of the 1996 Olympic Games, it was more extensive than necessary
to serve that interest because it imposed a "blatant content-based restric-
tion"" as a prior restraint to all forms of commercial speech other
than those advertising the Olympics.
80. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980), sets forth a four-part test for restrictions on commercial speech: (1) Is the
speech lawful and not misleading? If so, it is protected by the First Amendment, and
the court must ask: (2) whether the asserted government interest is substantial. If it is,
the court must determine (3) wheter the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted and (4) whether it is not more extensive than necessary to serve that
interest.
81. 885 F. Supp. 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
82. Id.
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